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The data are   
consistent with how a 
well-functioning futures 
market would behave, 
initially when there is 
tightness in the market, 
and later when there is 
considerable slack due to 
the global recession.
  Oil market speculation became an especially popular topic when the 
price of crude tripled over 18 months to a record high $145 per barrel 
in July 2008. Of particular interest to many is whether speculators drove 
oil prices beyond what fundamentals would have otherwise justified. We 
explore this issue over two Economic Letters. In this article, we look for evi-
dence in the futures market that would signal speculation primarily drove 
prices. In our companion Economic Letter, we examine the physical market.
T
here are several methods of speculation that could unduly affect 
the price of a commodity such as oil. Speculators can buy oil in 
the spot market and hoard it. Alternatively, they could purchase significant 
numbers of futures contracts, which would push up futures prices and, 
indirectly, prompt other market participants to hoard oil. Finally, producers 
themselves could speculate by withholding output, hoping to jolt prices 
higher.
  Each of these means of speculation would leave telltale signs in cer-
tain data, such as inventories. On the other hand, if fundamentals drove 
speculative activity and prices, the signs should be different.
  We reviewed various pieces of evidence, such as the behavior of 
inventories, supply and demand data, and macroeconomic variables, to 
see whether they support one hypothesis over the other. After examining 
futures-market-related data, it appears that fundamentals drove speculative 
activity and prices—rather than speculation dictating prices. A separate 
analysis of the cash, or “physical,” market presented in our companion 
Economic Letter produces similar findings.
  Chart 1 shows the nominal price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
crude oil. After bouncing around $20 per barrel throughout the 1990s, 
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prices trended upward after 2000. 
They almost doubled from $54 to $93 
in 2007, followed by another jump to 
the record daily high of $145 in July 
2008. Amid the global recession, they 
collapsed to $40 at the end of 2008. 
The near tripling of oil prices in a 
year and a half and the subsequent 
drop sparked much discussion about 
speculation. 
  An increase in the number of non-
commercial traders in the oil futures 
market prompted this discussion. 
Noncommercials now average about 
40 percent of open interest (the pro-
portion of futures contracts for 
which delivery hasn’t been made) 
for New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) West Texas Intermediate 
crude-oil futures contracts. That com-
pares with 10 to 15 percent in 2000 
(Chart 2). 
  Just who are the noncommercials 
and what do they do? In any futures 
market, some participants, such as 
producers or users of a commodity, 
want to hedge positions, and others 
solely seek monetary gain. The hedg-
ers are termed “commercials,” while 
those solely seeking monetary gain are 
termed “noncommercials,” or “specula-
tors.” Despite being lumped together, 
this group is made up of many differ-
ent participants, including hedge funds 
and commodity index investors.  
  In a literal sense, speculators bet 
on where the price of the commodity 
will go. If they are correct, they make 
a profit. In the grander scheme of 
things, however, speculators perform 
an economic function by making the 
market more liquid, acting as addi-
tional buyers and sellers, thus facilitat-
ing transactions and improving market 
efficiency. 
  This function is useful because 
there will always be a mismatch 
between hedgers going long (those 
who want to buy) and hedgers going 
short (those who want to sell). This 
can be due to a mismatch in quan-
tity—for example, more participants 
who want to go short than long. It 
can be due to a mismatch in timing—
a hedger who wants to go long is 
unable to find a corresponding hedger 
who wants to go short at a particular 
time. It can also reflect a mismatch of 
the duration of the desired contracts—
long hedgers may be interested in 
buying a six-month contract, but short 
hedgers may want to sell one-month 
contracts. In such cases, speculators 
can fill the void and correct these 
mismatches and improve market effi-
ciency.
  Chart 3 tracks the positions 
taken by noncommercials over time. 
Contrary to popular opinion, specula-
tors do not, as a whole, go only short 
or long. There are large numbers of 
both long and short contracts, as well 
as spreading positions, which occur 
when a trader has an equal number of 
long and short positions.1 An increase 
in spreading positions dominates the 
growth in both short and long posi-
tions. It is possible that the explosive 
growth in spreading positions is due to 
noncommercials taking different posi-
tions across the maturity structure—for 
example, going short in near months 
while going long in distant months.
Linking Futures and Spot Markets
  A central question is: How could 
“speculative” futures market activity 
translate into higher spot market prices?
  Spot prices are determined in the 
cash market where transactions are 
settled with oil physically changing 
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Oil Prices Volatile
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hands. Consequently, there is no trans-
mission mechanism tying futures prices 
to spot prices until transactions occur 
in the spot market. If futures markets 
work properly, arbitrage between sell-
ing today and in the future links spot 
and futures prices. For storable com-
modities, such as oil, it also connects 
those prices with inventories. 
  To see how this works, consider 
the following: Suppose a barrel of oil 
could be sold today at the spot price, 
S, or in the future for the futures price, 
F. If the owner sells now, he receives 
an immediate payment of S. In addi-
tion, that money could be invested 
and earn interest income, I. The owner 
also avoids the storage costs, C, that 
would be paid if the oil were sold in 
the future. At a minimum, the futures 
price must compensate the owner for 
the lost income from selling today, 
plus the lost interest income, and for 
storage costs.2 
  Based on this, we can link futures 
and spot prices:
F = S + I + C.
  This equation does not hold 
perfectly in the real world, but it pro-
vides useful intuition about prices and 
inventories. For example, sometimes 
the futures price will be significantly 
higher than what this equation says it 
should be. When this occurs, sellers 
are receiving an unusually large pre-
mium to sell in the future as opposed 
to the present. Market participants will 
respond by choosing to sell more in 
the future and less today. Over time, 
this should prompt inventories to rise, 
spot prices to increase and futures 
prices to decrease. This continues until 
futures and spot prices are in line with 
the equation. When futures prices are 
below what this equation says they 
should be, market participants receive 
the opposite signal and respond by 
selling more today instead of in the 
future. 
  In short, during normal times, the 
futures price should be higher than the 
spot price—with the premium roughly 
equaling the cost of storage and lost 
interest income—and inventories 
should be abundant. In certain situa-
tions, such as when demand is tempo-
rarily high or supply temporarily low, 
the spot price will be higher than the 
futures price, and inventories will be 
relatively low.
  Chart 4 uses actual data since 
2004 for the NYMEX West Texas 
Intermediate futures contract to show 
the relationship between inventories 
at Cushing, Okla., (where WTI spot 
Chart 3
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Chart 4
Oil Price Spread Varies with Inventory Levels
(Six-month future prices – spot prices)
Spread in dollars
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Cushing, Okla., Inventories and Six-Month Spread 
Illustrate Recession Impact
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prices are determined) and the spread, 
or difference, between the price of 
the six-month futures contract and 
the spot price. When inventories are 
relatively low, the spot price tends to 
exceed the six-month futures price, 
and the spread is negative. When 
inventories are high, the spot price 
tends to be below the futures price, 
and the spread moves into positive 
territory. Specifically, once invento-
ries exceed roughly 22 million bar-
rels, there are no instances where the 
spread is negative. 
  Several outliers appear in the 
chart where the spread is relatively 
large. One might view this as a sign 
of potential excessive speculation, but 
looking at inventories and how the 
spread evolves over time, a different 
picture emerges (Chart 5). The shaded 
bars indicate the periods when the 
outliers occurred. The bulk of the out-
liers were in late 2008 and early 2009, 
when the world economy was in 
recession. The likely explanation for 
the abnormal spread is the unexpect-
edly low demand that occurred then, 
causing the spot price to plunge. 
  Perhaps more importantly, most 
of the data for 2007 and 2008 point to a 
persistent tightness in the crude-oil mar-
ket. Inventories were relatively low and 
the spread negative during most of that 
period. If speculation in the futures mar-
ket was responsible for the price hike, 
very large positive spreads would have 
been followed by significant increases in 
inventories. Instead, the data are in line 
with what the theory predicts we should 
see when market tightness and a rea-




  Activity in the crude oil futures 
market increased appreciably in the past 
decade, as did the number of noncom-
mercial traders, the so-called specula-
tors. This coincided with rising oil prices 
but didn’t necessarily cause them. No 
transmission mechanism linking futures 
prices to spot prices appears until 
transactions occur in the spot market. 
Looking at the 2007–09 period, the data 
are consistent with how a well-func-
tioning futures market would behave, 
initially when there is tightness in the 
market, and later when there is consid-
erable slack due to the global recession. 
Futures market traders, therefore, seem 
to have been routine market partici-
pants. 
Plante is a research economist and Yücel is a 
senior economist and vice president at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 In an example of such a spreading position, a 
speculator goes long in the three-month contract 
but short in the six-month one (betting prices will 
go up in the short term and down longer term).
2 There may be other costs and/or benefits than 
those listed here that accrue from selling in the 
future as opposed to the past. More complicated 
theories attempt to explicitly model these.
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